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New York’s Inbred Judiciary: Pathologies of
Nomination and Appointment of Court of
Appeals Judges
JAMES A. GARDNER†
INTRODUCTION
The problem of how to select judges has bedeviled
Americans for more than two centuries. Its unusual
difficulty arises from the peculiar mix of qualities that
judges in a democratic society must possess. First, judges
must be independent to serve effectively as a counterweight
to executive and legislative power. At the same time, they
must paradoxically be accountable in some degree to ensure
that they operate within the limits established by popular
authority. Finally, judges must be highly skilled legal
craftspersons to serve as effective stewards of the legal
system and indeed of the rule of law itself.
Judges may be selected in many different ways, but
various methods typically do a better job of selecting for
some of these qualities than others. Election of judges, for
example, produces accountability, but is hard-pressed to
guarantee quality. Gubernatorial appointment is calculated
to protect quality, but risks sacrificing independence and
accountability. Various hybrid systems such as the
“Missouri Plan,” which pairs initial gubernatorial

† Vice Dean for Academic Affairs and Joseph W. Belluck and Laura L.
Aswad Professor of Civil Justice, University at Buffalo Law School, State
University of New York. An earlier version of this article was presented as
testimony to the New York State Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary,
Buffalo, NY, May 21, 2009.
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appointment with subsequent retention elections,1 try to
balance all three criteria.
Like many jurisdictions, New York has over time
employed numerous systems of judicial selection, and
currently uses several different methods to select judges for
its various courts. Judges of the New York Supreme Court,
the general trial court, are generally elected in partisan
elections, although judges of the Court of Claims are
appointed by the governor subject to senatorial
confirmation.2 Justices of the Appellate Division of New
York Supreme Court, the intermediate appeals court, are
selected by gubernatorial appointment, but the governor
may choose only from among judges who have been elected
to the lower trial court bench, superimposing considerations
of merit onto a set of candidates possessing a democratic
pedigree.3 Selection of judges to the Court of Appeals, the
state’s highest court, proceeds by yet another method, one
often denominated a “merit” system because of its emphasis
on producing judges of the highest possible quality.
Under the current system, Court of Appeals judges are
appointed by the governor, subject to senatorial
confirmation, from a list of nominees forwarded by a
Commission on Judicial Nomination.4 The twelve members
of the Commission, who are charged with scouring the state
for the best and most qualified nominees, are appointed by
the governor, the chief judge of the state, and the four
highest-ranking members of the Assembly.5 This is clearly a
system meant to produce nominees of substantial
independence, some very limited and indirect democratic
pedigree, and great capability. Such a system—now
promoted actively by no less a legal celebrity than retired
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor6—seems

1. For a good discussion of methods of judicial selection, including the
Missouri Plan, see Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 714-25 (1995).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 9, 21.
3. See id. at § 4(c).
4. Id. at § 2.
5. Id. at § 2(d).
6. E.g., John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2009, at A12.
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well designed to produce judges of the best possible quality
and significant independence.
But this is New York, and one must never
underestimate the ability of New York officials to subvert
the operation of a seemingly good process.
The curtain hiding the inner workings of New York’s
merit selection system fell aside slightly during the recent
proceedings following Chief Judge Judith Kaye’s
announcement that she would resign at the end of 2008. As
required by law, the Commission on Judicial Nomination
undertook a search for qualified replacements and, after
deliberating, forwarded a list of seven nominees to Governor
David A. Paterson. The list, however, contained no female
nominees, an omission that the Governor criticized loudly
and publicly.7 In response, the Commission revealed a
considerable amount of information about its processes and
its applicant pool, disclosing along the way that only three
women had even applied for the chief judgeship.8 This
response apparently satisfied the Governor, who went on to
elevate Jonathan Lippman, then New York’s chief
administrative judge, to the position of Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals.
The Governor’s question about the diversity of the
nominee pool is a fair one, but the information released by
the Commission prompts a more interesting line of inquiry.
According to the Commission’s data concerning the Court of
Appeals appointment process, the question isn’t why only
three women applied and none were nominated. The real
question turns out to be this: why does virtually no one,
male or female, black or white, experienced or
inexperienced, talented or untalented, apply for vacancies
at the New York Court of Appeals? Despite what the
Commission describes as substantial outreach efforts,9 a
grand total of seventeen individuals bothered to apply for
7. Jeremy W. Peters, Paterson Criticizes Panel for Its Judicial Selections,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A39.
8. Letter from John F. O’Mara, Chair of N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial
Nomination, to N.Y. Senator John L. Sampson (March 25, 2009), http://www.ny
segov.com/cjn/assets/documents/press/OMara_Judiciary_Committee_Update_Le
tter.pdf.
9. Letter from John F. O’Mara, Chair of N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial
Nomination, to Governor David A. Paterson (December 17, 2008),
http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/files/2008/12/judicial.pdf.
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the job of head of the entire judicial branch of the State of
New York.10 That bears repeating: in a completely open
application process, only seventeen people applied to be the
chief judge of New York. Indeed, the Commission’s data
shows that it has never received even fifty applications for
any Court of Appeals seat that has opened up in the thirtythree years since New York adopted its current method of
gubernatorial appointment.11 The typical number of
applications is fewer than thirty.12
Thus, the important question is: why aren’t more people
willing to apply for these jobs? Perhaps only the
Commission really knows, and of course it can say nothing
due to the confidential nature of its communications with
potential applicants. Nevertheless, even a cursory
examination of the actual appointments made by New York
governors over the last three decades yields a pretty obvious
answer. Although the current method of selecting Court of
Appeals judges was designed to be wide open and based
entirely on merit, the selection process, as it has actually
evolved in practice, is neither. It has instead degenerated
into a fundamentally closed competition among a very small
number of sitting, experienced justices of the Appellate
Division. It has become, in other words, a process not of
judicial appointment but of judicial promotion.
There are at present only sixty-five sitting Appellate
Division justices.13 If the main point of promoting justices
from the Appellate Division is to secure the benefits of prior
appellate judicial experience, fewer than half of sitting
Appellate Division justices have even five years experience,
so the potential field is limited realistically from the outset
to fewer than thirty.14 Among these, the candidates with the
greatest prospects of success are naturally those who are
members of the governor’s party or whom the governor
otherwise has some reason to find appealing. This of course
drastically limits the field of actual prospects, and
10. O'Mara, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See New York State Unified Court System, Appellate Divisions,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/appellatedivisions.shtml (last visited June
14, 2008).
14. Id.
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knowledge of these realities among the pool of potential
candidates
undoubtedly
discourages
interest
in
applications.
It thus appears that, in practice, the pool of individuals
with a realistic chance for appointment to the Court of
Appeals consists of perhaps a dozen or fifteen senior judges
of the state’s intermediate appellate court. This cannot
possibly be what the people of New York intended when
they approved the constitutional change to merit selection.
I. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
Like any other state high court, the New York Court of
Appeals performs two principal functions. First, it exercises
ultimate responsibility for overseeing the application and
development of state law in the courts of the state. Second,
it sits at the apex of a co-equal branch of state government,
and in that role, by constitutional design, serves as a check
on and counterweight to the state’s executive and legislative
branches.
One of the most important ways to make sure that this
or any other court successfully performs its institutional
duties is to see that it is populated by judges of appropriate
talent and dispositions. This leads directly to the question of
the method of judicial appointment.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, judges in New York
were selected by gubernatorial appointment. The
Constitution of 1846 ended this system in favor of popular
elections for all judicial offices.15 This change in practice
occurred as part of a Jacksonian wave of reform that swept
the nation.16 In New York, however, the switch to an elective
judiciary responded just as much to a belief that the state’s
governors were dispensing judgeships as political
patronage, resulting in the appointment of judges who were
either unduly beholden to the governor or corrupt in that
they had obtained their positions by performing service to
the governor or his party.17
15. PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW
YORK 82-83, 105-06 (1996); PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION:
A REFERENCE GUIDE 128-29 (1991).
16. Croley, supra note 1, at 714-25.
17. See GALIE, supra note 15, at 105.
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By 1977, however, dissatisfaction with the “unseemly
spectacle of expensive, bitterly contested, partisan elections
for seats on the highest court in the state” led to
amendment of the New York Constitution to implement a
new system for selecting judges of the Court of Appeals, one
based on merit.18 This amendment provided the current
system, in which judges are appointed to the Court of
Appeals by the governor, but the governor is restricted in
his possible appointments to candidates forwarded by the
Commission on Judicial Nomination. As in systems of
lower-level civil service employment, the Commission’s role
is to serve as an impartial filter to identify the very best
candidates from among New York’s thousands of lawyers,
public officials, and public figures. By this method, the New
York Constitution attempts to avoid burdening nominees
with the obligation to campaign for office, while
simultaneously blocking the patronage abuses of the early
nineteenth century and ensuring that the governor appoints
only judges of the highest ability and integrity.
For more than one hundred years, from the 1870s
through the 1970s, the New York Court of Appeals was
regarded as one of the very best state courts in the nation,
one that other state supreme courts routinely looked to for
leadership on legal issues of common concern. Most studies
that have examined the reputation and impact of state
supreme courts through the 1970s ranked the New York
Court of Appeals first or second among the nation’s high
courts. By the close of the twentieth century, the Court’s
impact had fallen dramatically. A recent study of the
frequency with which state courts cite one another’s
decisions—a not unreasonable proxy for reputation among
fellow supreme court judges—ranked the New York Court of
Appeals twenty-fourth.19 Paradoxically, New York’s switch
to merit selection of its judges coincides with a decline in
the Court’s national reputation. To be sure, there are good
reasons to be skeptical of ranking exercises. Even so, the

18. Id. at 339.
19. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric Posner, Which States Have the Best
(and Worst) High Courts? 16 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 217, 2008).
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belief that the Court is no longer what it used to be is
widely shared among the bar and informed observers.20
II. PROFILE OF COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES
New York contains the deepest pool of legal talent in
the nation. It is home to more than 150,000 attorneys, a
total exceeding that of any other state and comprising one of
every eight American lawyers.21 New York contains fifteen
law schools, more than any other state except California,
giving it the highest per capita concentration of legal
learning in the nation.22 As a global center of international
commerce and finance, New York disproportionately draws
the most talented law school graduates from across the
United States.
Given the unparalleled depth of its legal talent and its
constitutional commitment to merit-based selection, New
York surely ought to have the best high court bench in the
nation. Does it? Although no one would be inclined to deny
the general competence of the Court of Appeals and its
judges, I suspect that few believe that the Court’s recent
membership fairly reflects the range and depth of talent of
the state’s population. An examination of the backgrounds
of appointees to the Court during the last thirty years
confirms this suspicion.
In considering the characteristics of New York Court of
Appeals appointees, a useful point of comparison is the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a
court that draws its membership from the same population
and which has long been regarded as one of the finest
appellate courts in the nation. Since New York adopted its
current system of merit-based appointment to the Court of
20. See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre & Amanda Hiller, Public Law at the
New York Court of Appeals: An Update on Developments, 2000, 64 ALB. L. REV.
1355, 1357-61 (2001).
21. American Bar Association, Statistical Resources,
http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/Pages/StatisticalResources.aspx (last
visited June 14, 2010).
22. New York’s law schools are Albany, Brooklyn, Cardozo, City University of
New York, Columbia, Cornell, Fordham, Hofstra, New York Law School, New
York University, Pace, St. John’s, Syracuse, Touro, and University at Buffalo.
For a list of accredited law schools, see AALS Member Schools,
http://www.aals.org/about_memberschools.php (last visited June 14, 2010).
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Appeals in 1977, a total of twenty-seven judges have been
appointed to the Second Circuit.23 Of this group, twelve had
careers at blue chip law firms with nationwide practices. Six
had been legal academics, including well-regarded former
professors at Yale and Columbia Law Schools, and the
former Dean of Yale Law School, one of the leading legal
minds of his generation. Three previously served as United
States Attorneys, and eight others served as federal or state
criminal prosecutors. Twelve held positions of responsibility
in a state, federal, or local executive agency. Four held
positions of responsibility with U.S. congressional
committees. Two had been elected members of a state
legislature. Fourteen had served as judges of the United
States District Court and five as state court judges,
including one former associate judge of the New York Court
of Appeals.
The picture that emerges from this summary is clear.
Appointees to New York’s federal appellate bench have by
and large distinguished themselves in arenas other than the
judiciary. They are people with significant accomplishments
in legal practice and in government service overwhelmingly
in the executive branch. About half were appointed without
any prior judicial experience at all, and even those who
previously served at the federal trial level had already
distinguished themselves in some area of legal
accomplishment other than judicial service.
The judges of the New York Court of Appeals present a
very different profile.24 Eighteen judges have been appointed
to New York’s high court since the advent of merit selection
in 1977. Of these, only four had significant careers at the
highest levels of private practice. Only one was a
prosecutor. Five had significant executive branch
experience. One spent time on the faculty of a law school.
But the most telling statistics are those relating to prior
judicial service: sixteen of the eighteen appointees had
previously served on the New York Supreme Court or Court
23. For a chart summarizing the information contained in this paragraph, see
infra Table 1; see also USCourts.gov, Second Circuit Judges,
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/judgesmain.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).
24. For a chart summarizing the information contained in this paragraph, see
infra Table 2; see generally THE JUDGES OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS: A
BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY 1 (Albert M. Rosenblatt ed., 2007). Information about
judges appointed since 2007 appears at www.courts.state.ny/ctapps.
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of Claims, and nine had previously held appointments to the
Appellate Division. In addition, six had served as
permanent clerks or law secretaries to sitting state judges,
or in an administrative role within the judicial branch. Only
two had no prior service as a state judge.
This pattern, incidentally, persists even if one looks at
the thirty-year period preceding the institution of meritbased appointment. Between 1946 and 1977, nineteen
judges earned seats on the Court of Appeals. Although the
position was then elective, seven of these first took their
seats upon a gubernatorial appointment to fill a vacancy. Of
that group, all but two had no significant accomplishments
outside the lower court positions from which they were
appointed.
Thus, in the last sixty years of gubernatorial
appointments, all but four of the twenty-five judges
appointed to the Court of Appeals were appointed directly
from the lower state court bench. (Two of those four,
incidentally, were Chief Judges Fuld and Kaye, widely
regarded as among the most capable judges to sit on the
Court in the twentieth century.) The judges of the New York
Court of Appeals, in other words, overwhelmingly have been
distinguished mainly for having worked their way up
through the state judiciary.25
I do not wish to be understood to minimize the value of
prior judicial experience. Appellate judges who have
previously sat on an appellate court know how the job is
done and can make a seamless transition to the state’s
highest court. Those who have previously sat on a trial
bench bring a useful perspective to the job of reviewing the
work of trial courts. Such judges are likely to be sound
technicians who can ensure reliability and consistency in
the application of the law, and who know from experience
where many of the problems lie in the state’s administration
of justice.
On the other hand, a uniform policy of promoting from
within has certain obvious drawbacks for assembling a high
25. The proportion of New York’s judges elevated from lower state courts
(84%) is also notable when compared to the practice of other states. According
to a recent study, nationwide about 63.5% of all sitting state high court judges
have some prior judicial experience. See Gregory L. Acquaviva & John D.
Castiglione, Judicial Diversity on State Supreme Courts, 39 SETON HALL L. REV.
1203, 1233 (2009).
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court of the greatest possible talent and most appropriate
qualifications, especially in New York. First, there is the
matter of how people get in the door in the first place – by
securing a seat on the Supreme Court, the state’s general
trial bench. Here we must be honest. Talent has rather little
to do with becoming a New York trial judge. The most
significant qualification is obtaining the favor of a local
party leader. Talented men and women may well sit on the
bench, but if they do it is in spite of the route to
appointment, not because of it. Few of the most talented
legal minds in New York are interested in the burden of
running for an office for which they consider themselves
self-evidently qualified, and even fewer are interested in the
sometimes demeaning process of seeking—and trading for—
political patronage. This was, of course, precisely the hurdle
that merit appointment was supposed to short-circuit.
Instead, the very same obstacle has been reintroduced by a
consistent gubernatorial practice of making election to the
Supreme Court a de facto qualification for appointment to
the Court of Appeals.
Second, a policy of virtually uniform appointment from
within the judicial branch is by no means a formula for
producing the kind of independence of mind that the New
York Constitution contemplates in designating the judiciary
one of three co-equal branches in what is meant to be a
working system of meaningful checks and balances. A
career spent within the narrow confines of the lower state
courts is not likely to cultivate the kind of large view and
self-assurance necessary to stand up to the other branches
in times of conflict.26 The kind of background that we see
among Second Circuit judges seems more suited to this
enterprise; significant personal achievement and leadership
in the executive branch, the private sector, or academia are
experiences more likely to produce the necessary confidence
and independence in legal minds of native talent.

26. A recent example is the Court of Appeals’ disgraceful capitulation to the
governor’s “appointment” of a lieutenant governor, an act for which the New
York Constitution makes absolutely no provision; indeed, it is absurd to think
that any constitution would permit a sitting governor to appoint his own
successor without the involvement of any other branch of government or the
people. See Skelos v. Paterson, 915 N.E.2d 1141 (2009).
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III. THE ROLE OF THE NOMINATING COMMISSION
The process by which Court of Appeals judges are
appointed does not rest exclusively in the hands of New
York’s governors; the Commission on Judicial Nomination
also plays an important role. The Commission’s involvement
raises the question of whether it has contributed in any way
to the development of the current, desultory appointment
practices. The answer seems to be that although the
Commission has contributed to the problem by forwarding
to the governor a constant stream of Appellate Division
justices or administrative state judges, it has also done a
reasonably decent job under difficult circumstances of
including among its nominees at least some candidates who
would bring more wide-ranging qualities to the job. The
Commission’s task has been greatly complicated by the
appointing proclivities of a long series of governors.
First, the Commission faces a great challenge in the low
volume of applications. Independent-minded New York
lawyers who are not presently sitting on the Appellate
Division know they will not get picked for the job and
understand
that,
notwithstanding
New
York’s
constitutional commitment to merit-based appointment,
appointment is in fact not based primarily on merit.
Applying is therefore a waste of time. Add to this the low
regard in which the judiciary is obviously held by officials of
the other branches; the low pay; the need to run first for
lower judicial office; and the complete failure of the New
York Senate to serve as a legitimate check on the
gubernatorial appointment power, and it is a miracle that
any of the state’s most accomplished lawyers outside the
judicial branch would for a moment contemplate even
taking a phone call from the Commission, much less
permitting their names to be put forward.
Understandably, given gubernatorial appointment
preferences over the last sixty years, the Commission has
for every vacancy provided a list of nominees weighted
heavily toward sitting justices of the Appellate Division and
the Supreme Court. In its thirty-year history, the
Commission has forwarded 160 nominations for twenty-two
vacancies.27 Of the nominees, 112 (70%) have been sitting
27. NEW YORK COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL NOMINATION, CANDIDATES NOMINATED
APPOINTMENT TO THE NEW YORK STATE COURT OF APPEALS, 1979 TO PRESENT,

FOR
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New York judges: twelve incumbent Court of Appeals
judges, sixty-five justices of the Appellate Division, thirtytwo judges of a state trial court, two judges in the state
judicial administrative system, and one former judge of the
Supreme Court. To its credit, the Commission has also
nominated individuals who have made their reputation in
law outside the state lower court system. On nine occasions
it has nominated a judge of the U.S. District Court, though
it has not done so in twenty years. Fourteen of its
nominations have been members of the state’s legal
academy, including the law deans of New York University,
Fordham, and Albany. Other nominees include practitioners
at some of the nation’s leading law firms, past presidents of
leading New York bar associations, and a former counsel to
the governor. Of course, a succession of governors has
chosen not to appoint such individuals, so their continued
willingness to apply is surely at risk.
Under the circumstances in which it operates, the
Commission probably has not done a bad job. Still, one
might ask: where are the former governors, attorneys
general,
legislative
leaders,
county
executives,
commissioners of leading state agencies, mayors, or
administrators of federal agencies? Where, in short, are the
people who have held high positions of leadership outside
the formal confines of New York’s own judicial branch?
IV. SOLUTIONS?
Because the problem with appointment to the Court of
Appeals seems to lie with the way in which New York
governors have chosen to exercise discretionary power, it
does not admit of easy solutions. One possibility might be
that the Senate begins to take seriously its constitutional
role in the confirmation process and insist upon populating
the Court with independent-minded individuals from more
varied backgrounds that better reflect the depth of legal
talent in the state. In New York, however, to hope for a
change in legislative practice is probably every bit as futile
as to hope for a change in gubernatorial practice.
A second option would be for the Commission to
compensate for gubernatorial proclivities by drastically
http://www.nysegov.com/cjn/assets/documents/CJN%20Nominees%20for%20Cou
rt%201979%20to%20present.pdf.
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limiting the number of sitting judges it nominates. For
example, it might confine itself to a single sitting judge—the
very best the state has to offer—and then nominate people
from other backgrounds, perhaps without any duplication in
any single category. This might force governors to think
more seriously about appointments that do more than
promote from within.
A third possibility might be for the Commission to
generate greater publicity earlier in the process concerning
the nominees it is contemplating. Perhaps it could circulate
a preliminary draft with a public comment period. This
might allow a better airing of the Commission’s criteria, and
permit talented people to present themselves after they
have seen what the preliminary list looks like.
Finally, the Commission might take a lesson from
diversity outreach efforts in other areas of high-level
employment. When prominent organizations need to find
leaders, they do not wait for applications, nor do they
merely beat the bushes to scare up good-looking
applications. Instead, they identify and go after people they
want through targeted, personalized recruiting efforts. The
Commission on Judicial Nomination is a government organ
of constitutional stature. It is open to the Commission to
interpret its role as more than merely a passive screener of
applicants. Given the state’s constitutional history
described earlier, it is not unreasonable to conceive of the
Commission as playing a stronger and more affirmative role
in safeguarding the quality and constitutional efficacy of the
Court of Appeals. Thus, in the absence of any other
development, the Commission might do well to identify and
seek out people it thinks ought to sit on the Court, and to
energetically induce them to permit their names to be
placed in nomination.

Jud. Admin.

Perm Clerk/Secy

USDC

State Highest



State Appellate



Judicial
Branch

State Trial



Elected

Congress. Staff

Local

ADA

DA

AUSA

US Attorney

Academia

National

Legislative
Branch

Federal

1979
1979
1981
1981
1981
1982
1985
1985
1986
1989
1990
1992
1993
1994
1994
1994
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
2001
2002
2003
2004
2007
2009

Other Exec.
Branch

Prosecutor

State

Kearse
Newman
Cardamon
Pierce
Winter
Pratt
Altimari
Miner
Mahoney
Walker
McLaughlin
Jacobs
Leval
Cabranes
Calabresi
Parker, F.
Pooler
Sack
Sotomayor
Straub
Katzmann
Parker, B.
Raggi
Wesley
Hall
Livingston
Lynch

Local or Regional

Judge

Year Appointed

Private
Practice











  














Asst Secy US Dept of Treasury
Fordham Law School prof
Simpson, Thacher
Cleary, Gottlieb
Rutgers-Newark, Gen Counsel Yale U
Dean of Yale Law School
Deputy Attorney General of Vermont
Syracuse Corp Counsel, NY agencies
Patterson, Belknap; Gibson, Dunn







Colum Cty DA, Hudson Corp Counsel



































































Dpty Comm’r NYC Police Dept
Yale Law School professor











Hughes, Hubbard
HEW, US Sen staff, US Atty D. Conn.



 






Notes

















Wilkie Farr; NY Assembly, NY Senate
Georgetown, Brookings
Morrison & Foerster
Cahill; Interim U.S. Attorney
NY Assembly, NY Court of Appeals
U.S. Attorney, D. Vt.
Paul, Weiss; Michigan Law School
Columbia Law School prof
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